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Abstract 
Economic crises cause companies to reduce their investment, including investment in 
innovation where returns are uncertain and long-term. This has been confirmed by the 
2008 financial crisis, which has substantially reduced the willingness of firms to invest 
in innovation. However, the reduction in investment has not been uniform across 
companies and a few even increased their innovation expenditures. Through the analysis 
of a fresh European Survey, this paper compares drivers of innovation investment 
before, during and following on from the crisis, applying the Schumpeterian hypotheses 
of creative destruction and technological accumulation. Before the crisis, incumbent 
enterprises are more likely to expand their innovation investment, while after the crisis a 
few, small enterprises and new entrants are ready to “swim against the stream” by 
expanding their innovative related expenditures. 
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1. The effect of an economic shock on long-term investment 
 
Major economic shocks, such as the 2008 financial crisis, make business opportunities 
less certain, and, in turn, companies become less willing to invest in long-term activities 
where returns are risky. Most companies react to a short- or medium-term adverse 
macroeconomic environment by downsizing expenditures, including expenditures on 
investment and innovation. However, economic crises also provide an opportunity for 
companies, industries and entire nations to restructure productive facilities and to 
explore new opportunities. Smart companies do perceive that an economic crisis will 
not last forever and that a recovery will sooner or later arrive. A new economic cycle, 
however, is also likely to bring structural changes in the composition of output and 
demand. In order to reap benefits from opportunities in changing economic 
environments, successful companies need to be prepared to provide new and improved 
goods and services. 
As already predicted by Schumpeter and the Schumpeterian economics, while an 
economic crisis has an adverse impact on most of the economic agents, in the long-run 
it will not generate losers only. On the one hand, a few economic agents may emerge as 
winners and we assume that they will be found among those companies that understand 
earlier than others that the composition of output and relative prices to emerge from the 
crisis will be very different from the past. On the other hand, losers are more likely to be 
found among those firms that react not just by reducing employment and productive 
capacity in general, but also downsizing their investment in innovation. Which are the 
key characteristics of the companies belonging to the two categories? 
The 2008 economic crisis offers a unique opportunity to test two models of 
innovation originating from Schumpeter and the Schumpeterian economics and that can 
be labelled creative destruction and technological accumulation. In turn, these models 
may help us to identify what will be the typology of companies that will lead the 
recovery. Our paper is an attempt to test the interplay between the forces of creative 
destruction and accumulation in innovation before, during and after the financial crisis 
that started in the Fall of 2008. In fact, there was in Europe a substantial drop of 
innovative investment (Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011), and this leads to wonder what 
are the best strategies that should be taken at the country level (see Sharif, 2012).  
Our analysis is made possible thanks to a recent wave of the Innobarometer 
Survey designed and collected by the European Commission in 2009 (European 
Commission, 2009). Each year the Innobarometer introduces a different topic and the 
2009 survey emphasises innovation related expenditure, including the effects on it of 
the economic downturn. Enterprises from the 27 EU member states, plus Norway and 
Switzerland responded to the survey. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the state of the art against 
which the paper is set. Section 3 develops the conceptual framework by providing a 
sketch of the two ideal type models of creative accumulation and creative destruction. 
Section 4 introduces the dataset and methodology. Section 5 presents the results that are 
discusses in the last Section.   
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2. Innovation generated through technological accumulation and economic 
creative destruction 
 
The young Schumpeter (1911) looked at innovation as an event that could revolutionize 
economic life by bringing into the fore new entrepreneurs, new companies and new 
industries. The mature Schumpeter (1942), on the contrary, observed and described the 
activities of large oligopolistic corporations, able to perform R&D and innovation as a 
routine by building on their previous competences. The relative importance of these two 
processes has been further investigating in the Schumpeterian tradition (see Nelson and 
Winter, 1982; Breschi et al., 2000; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995; Patel and Pavitt, 1994). 
Creative destruction is described as a result of a regime characterized by low 
cumulativeness and high technological opportunities, leading to an environment with 
greater dynamism in terms of technological ease of entry and exit, as well as a major 
role played by entrepreneurs and fierce competition. Creative accumulation is 
associated with a technological regime that is characterized by high cumulativeness and 
low technological opportunities, bringing about more stable environments in which the 
bulk of innovation is carried out by large and established firms incrementally, leading to 
a market structure with high entry barriers and oligopolistic competition. 
There are arguments supporting the relevance of cumulativeness and of 
reinforcing patterns of technological development and innovation, and arguments 
lending support to a “destruction/discontinuous hypothesis”. Concerning the former, 
several studies suggest that learning processes that underlie innovation activities are 
both local and cumulative resulting in path-dependency (e.g. Pavitt et al., 1989; 
Antonelli, 1997; Pavitt, 2005). In addition, empirical evidence indicates that there is a 
degree of persistence in innovation and among innovators (Cefis and Orsenigo, 2001). 
Concerning the latter, it has often been stressed that there are periods of turbulence 
associated with a change in the leading sectors and/or the emergence of new sectors, 
which brings about a decline of technological and profit opportunities in established 
industries (Perez, 2002). This, in turn, might lead to a change in the knowledge and 
technological base for innovation and could substantially affect the hierarchy of 
innovators (Devez et al., 2005). Other research has stressed the fact that firm-specific 
organizational routines and capabilities can bring about inertia and hamper the capacity 
of established firms to keep up with major discontinuities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Leonard-Barton, 1992; Levinthal and March, 1993). 
This should also be related to the “continuity” thesis advocated by Chandler 
(1977) and his followers on the grounds of the fact that the population of incumbent, 
large firms has remained stable over the last decades. This thesis has been challenged by 
Simonetti (1996), Louca and Mendonca (1999), and by Freeman and Louca (2001), who 
claim that a stream of new firms has joined incumbent firms during periods of radical 
discontinuities. This can also be contingent to the specific knowledge base and technical 
skills attached to different industries. For example, while Klepper and Simons (2000) 
show that firms established in making radios were successful in developing colour TVs, 
Holbrock et al. (2000) illustrate that this pattern is not mirrored in the evolution of the 
semiconductor industry.  
In this paper the emphasis is not on specific industries or technologies, but rather 
on how an external shock, represented by the financial crisis, is affecting companies’ 
innovative strategies. As a result, we expect to find an array of different innovation 
drivers both before and in response to the crisis. These are examined in view of the 
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changes at the macro level, as we aim to understand whether the crisis has led to some 
variation/discontinuity at the aggregate level as a result of a different composition 
among innovating firms. 
 
 
3. An attempt to identify the core characteristics of creative destruction and 
technological accumulation 
 
To guide the analysis we elaborate on the ideal type models of creative destruction and 
creative accumulation as two possible aggregate outcomes of micro behaviours. 
Creative destruction describes a dynamic environment in which new firms emerge as 
the most significant innovators as a result of a major discontinuity such as an economic 
downturn. Creative accumulation is underpinned by a more stable pattern of innovation 
which emphasizes cumulativeness and persistency of innovative activities in response to 
the crisis. We make here an attempt to identify these two patterns in relation to firm 
behaviour rather than to the evolution of technological regimes. In this sense, our 
approach is complementary to the research pioneered by Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) 
to identify Schumpeterian patterns of innovation with reference to various technological 
fields.  
A sketch of the differences between the models of creative destruction and 
creative accumulation is given in Table 1 where four categories are singled out: i) 
characteristics of the innovating firm, ii) type of knowledge source dominant in the 
innovation process, iii) type of innovations, and iv) characteristics of the market.  
 
Table 1 Innovative firms’ characteristics in the context of the ideal type creative 
accumulation and creative destruction models 
 
 
Categories Creative accumulation Creative destruction 
Characteristics of the 
innovating firms 
 
Innovations are driven by 
large, incumbent firms that 
seek new solutions through 
formal research exploiting 
their pre-existing capability. 
 
Small firms, new entrants are 
key drivers in the innovation 
process. They use innovations 
and exploit economic 
turbulences to acquire market 
share from incumbent firms or 
to open new markets. 
Type of knowledge 
sources 
High relevance of past 
innovations and accumulated 
knowledge. Importance of 
formal R&D, in-house, but 
also jointly performed, or 
externally acquired. 
 
Higher relevance of 
collaborative arrangements 
leaning towards the applied 
knowledge base (other firms). 
Exploration of new markets 
and technological 
opportunities.  
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Type of innovations 
 
The innovation process is 
dominated by a large number 
of incremental innovations. 
Organizational routines drive 
the generation of innovations. 
The emphasis is on path-
breaking innovations often 
able to create new industries. 
New organizational forms 
contribute to generating 
innovations. 
Characteristics of the 
market  
Barriers to entry are high due 
to relative importance of 
appropriation and 
cumulativeness of knowledge 
and high costs of innovation. 
Dominance of oligopolistic 
markets.  Technological 
advancement based on path-
dependent and cumulative 
technological trajectories. 
Low barriers to entry into the 
newly emerging industries. A 
high rate of entry and exit 
leads to low levels of 
concentration and high 
competition. Discontinuous 
technologies are available that 
generate growing markets and 
new opportunities. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
In the empirical part of the paper some of these factors, those more directly associated 
to our data, will be used to test if the two ideal type models can be related to the patterns 
of innovation investment of firms. 
 
3.1 Characteristics of the innovating firms 
The creative accumulation model assumes that incumbent firms explore systematically 
technological opportunities. For them, to innovate is a routine, and it is one of the core 
things that the top management supervises. They have to upgrade periodically their 
products, often because they operate in concentrated oligopolistic industries. A stream 
of incremental innovation does not only guarantee that costs and prices are kept 
competitive, but also that products are differentiated and improved compared to those of 
the competition. This provides the possibility to accumulate knowledge and often not 
just in the areas of their core products. When new technological opportunities are 
identified, these companies may also be quick in entering into new fields and industries, 
thanks to their wide, accumulated knowledge (Laperche et al., 2011). However, when 
firms diversify, they tend to do so along some kind of technological relatedness, defined 
as coherence (Piscitello, 2004; Teece et al., 1994). Pavitt makes this point clear: “Given 
the increasingly specialized and professional nature of the knowledge on which they are 
based, manufacturing firms are path-dependent. […] it is difficult if not impossible to 
convert a traditional textile firm into one making semiconductors” (Pavitt, 2005, p. 95). 
By contrast, the creative destruction model emphasizes the role played by 
individual inventors and entrepreneurs. This model reflects a more uncertain landscape 
of early stages of new technologies. By anticipating or even creating technological 
opportunities, these far-sighted individuals manage to generate new firms and often new 
industries that substantially change the economic landscape. These individuals can be 
independent, e.g. setting up or owning their own business, but they can also be 
dependent and employed by (sometimes large) organisation. 
These individuals do not find the most conducive environment in existing 
organizations since learned and accumulated routine activities, organizational settings, 
and decision processes somehow discourage an entrepreneurial stance. Moreover, the 
larger the company, the greater might be a resistance to change by the company as a 
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whole. Thus, patterns linked to creative destruction are associated at the firm level with 
innovation driven by smaller size, and new entry into markets alongside established 
firms, as entrepreneurial activities might be greater due to lower inertia, greater 
flexibility and responsiveness to changes in demand conditions and technological 
discontinuities. This type of innovative behaviour could be found in spin-offs from 
established companies, universities or simply new businesses. 
 
3.2 Type of knowledge sources 
In creative accumulation routine-based research is more important as a key source in the 
innovation process than sudden insights. This favours the large firm that; i) has the 
capacity and the resources to set-up and maintain internal R&D laboratories, ii) can use 
interactions with others, and iii) has well-established internal functions (including 
design, production, and marketing). High-tech companies are also able to plug into the 
knowledge base of other companies, public institutions and countries. They are in the 
position to reduce the risks and costs associated with exploring new technological 
opportunities through strategic technological agreements, they have qualified personnel 
able to interact periodically with universities and public research centres, they can also 
establish intra-firm but international research networks through subsidiaries in other 
countries (Laperche et al., 2011). All these factors allow them to build on and add to 
their already existing competences. 
Creative destruction on the contrary will be based on internal sources that in 
some occasions, and for limited periods of time, represent the bulk of the firm’s 
economic activity, as it has happened for companies in emerging fields such as 
biotechnology and software. This will also be combined to the concentric exploration of 
new opportunities, to specific ventures with companies operating in other industries, or 
generating symbiotic contacts with university departments (see Breschi et al., 2000). In 
the case of small or newly established firms, the development of new products, services 
or processes is likely to favour external collaborations and strategic alliances over and 
above than in the case for large corporations. Such set-ups help to overcome possible 
resource, finance and capability constraints within new and comparatively small firms. 
 
3.3 Type of innovations 
Creative destruction is linked to patterns of path-breaking innovations and radically new 
solutions that are incompatible with traditional solutions. Several scholars have argued 
that in this case innovations are more likely to be introduced by new firms, as existing 
firms can face problems in terms of a lack of the adequate new skills and competences 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Leonard-Barton 1992), 
organizational adaptation (Levinthal and March, 1993), and difficulties in changing 
context (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1997). 
Creative accumulation is linked with frequent, but more incremental innovation 
patterns. Accumulation or cumulativeness suggests that firms innovation activities are 
driven by past innovation activities. Current technologies build on past experience of 
production and innovation specific to the firm. Malerba and Orsenigo (1995) and 
Breschi et al. (2000) suggest that cumulativeness of technological change is high when; 
i) the firm is established and can build on a history of innovation success, ii) there is a 
tradition of research carried out inside the firm. 
Pavitt and his colleagues suggested that incumbents might have the resilience to 
survive and to adapt to major changes (Pavitt et al., 1989, Patel and Pavitt, 1994). 
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Methé et al. (1996) present empirical evidence showing that established firms often are 
sources of major innovations, for example in telecommunications and medical 
instruments. In a similar vein, Iansiti and Levien (2004) suggest that, despite the many 
predictions about incumbents’ failures, technological transitions in the computer 
industry were survived by the overwhelming majority of firms. Studying a sample of 
large French firms, Laperche et al. (2011) also show how they have quickly modified 
their innovative strategies to face the post-crisis context. 
 
3.4 Characteristics of the market   
In a Schumpeterian model, firms compete to become oligopolistic in their market. This 
allows them to gain extra profits through the appropriation of returns from their 
innovations. In a dynamic context, the oligopolistic structure is seen as a necessary evil 
to foster dynamic efficiency led by the continuous introduction of innovations 
(following Schumpeter, 1942; see Galbraith, 1952; Sylos Labini, 1962; for a review 
Scherer, 1992; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982, Cohen, 1995). Creative destruction has 
been associated with a market structure characterized by high dynamism and 
competition, as well as high rate of change in the hierarchy of innovators. On the 
contrary, creative accumulation patters are linked to oligopolistic market structure with 
high entry barriers and high degree of stability of innovators. 
Nelson and Winter (1982) suggest that the market structure in a specific 
industry, the degree of concentration and rate of entry, are influenced by the degree to 
which technological opportunities arise and the ease with which innovations can be 
protected from imitation (i.e. the appropriability conditions). High technological 
opportunity together with low appropriability causes lower concentration in an industry 
and vice versa. These arguments are picked-up and empirically tested by Breschi et al. 
(2000) and Malerba and Orsenigo (1995, 1997) in their work on technological regimes 
and their role in the evolution of industrial structures, hierarchy of innovators and 
innovation activities. The following section operationalizes the concepts discussed in 
this section and summarized in Table 1.  
 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1 The data 
The empirical part of the paper analyses the Innobarometer Survey 2009 that is 
designed and collected by the European Commission (European Commission, 2009).  In 
each of the 27 EU Member States, plus Norway and Switzerland, 200 enterprises with 
main activities in innovation intensive industry sectors and with 20 or more employees 
were sampled.
1
 5,238 telephone interviews were completed between the 1
st
 and 9
th
 of 
                                                 
1
 In the smallest EU countries, Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg, the sample consisted of 70 enterprises 
and in non-EU countries, Switzerland and Norway, the sample size was 100. The industry sectors 
included are: aerospace, defence, construction equipment, apparel, automotive, building fixtures, 
equipment, business services, chemical products, communications equipment, construction materials, 
distribution services, energy, entertainment, financial services, fishing products, footwear, furniture, 
heavy construction services, heavy machinery, hospitality and tourism, information technology, jewellery 
and precious metals, leather products, lighting and electrical equipment, lumber and wood manufacturers, 
medical devices, metal manufacturing, oil and gas products and services, paper, (bio)pharmaceuticals, 
plastics, power generation & transmission, processed food, publishing and printing, sport and child goods, 
textiles, transportation and logistics, utility. 
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April 2009. The sample is a random sample, stratified by country, enterprise size (5 size 
bands) and industry (2-digit industry codes).
2
 
Since 2001 Innobarometer is conducted on a yearly basis. Each year the survey 
highlights a different issue/theme, which is picked up on in additional and specific 
questionnaire items over and above a core set of variables. The focus of the current, 
2009 survey is on innovation related expenditures and the effects of the economic 
downturn on innovation related expenditures. It is this section of the questionnaire from 
which our key variables are developed. In the remainder of this section we introduce our 
dependent and independent variables and discuss the methodology.   
 
4.2 The dependent variables 
Our dependent variables measure change in innovation related investment as it is 
reported by the firms themselves and with reference to different time periods (before, 
during and following on from the crisis). Innovation related investment are captured in a 
wide sense, incorporating not only expenditures on in-house R&D but also technology 
embodied in the purchase of machinery, equipment and software, licensed-in 
technology (patents or other know-how), training of staff in support of innovation, and 
expenditures on design of products, process and services. This broad definition (in line 
with the definition adopted in the Community Innovation Surveys) has advantages over 
a narrow definition, such as investment in R&D. R&D expenditures will not be able to 
capture short-term responses to the financial crisis on the grounds that R&D projects are 
typically commitments made for several years. Moreover, R&D is also concentrated in a 
few firms and sectors. In contrast, the wider definition of innovation related investments 
used in this paper that includes other innovation related expenditures over and above 
R&D, is better suited to capture short-term adjustments due to changes in the economic 
environment. Firms are quicker in cutting training for innovation, design budgets or 
purchases of software, than they are in adjusting R&D projects.  
Our dependent variables are based on firms’ responses to the following three 
questions.  
(a) before the crises: “compared to 2006 has the total amount spent by your firm 
on all innovation activities in 2008 increased, decreased or stayed approximately the 
same?”,  
(b) during the crisis: “in the last six months3 has your company taken one of the 
following actions as a direct result of the economic downturn; increased total amount of 
innovation expenditures, decreased […] or maintained […]?”, and  
(c) following on from the beginning of the crisis: “compared to 2008, do you 
expect your company to increase, decrease or maintain the total amount of its 
innovation expenditure in 2009?”.  
The observations feeding into the empirical analysis are all those firms that were 
innovation active and, thus, firms that stated they increase, decrease or maintain their 
innovation investment in the three periods respectively. The weakness of our dependent 
variables – change in innovation related investment – is that the scales are categorical 
rather than continuous (e.g. three choices as opposed to the total amount spent on 
                                                 
2
 A detailed description of the survey, including the sampling and data collection methods, can be found 
in a methodological report by the European Commission (2009). 
3
 The interviews were conducted between 1 and 9 April 2009, and, thus, the question relates to the period 
starting October 2008 ending with March 2009.  
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innovation); but the strength is that they provide a unique possibility to distinguish 
between three different time periods around the crisis.  
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the three dependent variables, 
including the number (frequency) and percent of enterprises that increased, maintained 
and decreased innovation investment under (a) time proxy for ‘before the crisis’ – we 
also refer to this as T1, (b) proxy for ‘during the crisis’ that we also refer to as T2 and 
(c) proxy for ‘following on from the crisis’ referred to as T3.4   
 
Table 2 Investment in innovation related activities before, during and following on 
from the beginning of the crisis  
 
 Dependent variable: 
change in innovation 
related investment 
Before the crisis During the crisis Following on from 
the beginning of 
the crisis 
(T1) (T2) (T3) 
  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Increase  1,985 38 453 9 659 13 
Decrease  472 9 1,231 24 1,560 30 
Maintain  2,207 42 2,961 57 2,452 47 
Innovation active firms 4,664 89 4,645 90 4,671 90 
No innovation activities 328 6 457 9 343 7 
Missing observations 242 5 132 3 220 4 
Number of observations 5,234 100 5,234 100 5,234 100 
T1 refers to the change in innovation related investment in the calendar year 2008 compared to 2006; T2 
refers to the change in innovation related investment in the six months period October 2008 to March 
2009; T3 refers to the expected  change in innovation related investment in 2009 compared with 2008.   
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Innobarometer, European Commission (2009a). 
 
Table 2 reveals two patterns. Firstly, 38% of enterprises reported that they increased 
innovation related investment in 2008 compared with their investment in 2006 (see 
Table 2 the “percent” column under T1); but, in T2 only 9% and in T3 13% of 
enterprises reported increased investment. Thus, there is a strong drop in the number of 
firms that increased innovation related investment during the crisis and following on 
from the crisis. This pattern is mirrored in a shift from few firms to many firms 
reporting decreased investment over the three time periods. In T1 only 9% of firms 
decreased their innovation related expenditures, but in the midst of the financial crisis – 
in T2 – 24% decreased investment and 30% planned to decrease investment in 2009 
compared to investment levels in 2008. This might at the aggregate level point towards 
destruction. Secondly, a large share of firms (about half of all firms) reported that they 
maintained innovation related investment irrespectively of the crisis leaning towards an 
accumulation hypothesis.  
                                                 
4
 The Innobarometer survey reports a lower number of non-innovation active firms compared with 
similar datasets, and specifically the Community Innovation Surveys. The following factors might 
contribute: (a) a difference in the industrial composition – “the enterprises interviewed in Innobarometer 
were sampled from sectors that are likely to be innovative” EC (2009), and (b) Innobarometer includes 
firms with 20 or more employees while the Community Innovation Survey includes enterprises with 10 
and more employees.  
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In Table 3 we report the cross-tabulations and Chi
2
 statistics between the 
dependent variables producing three cross-tabulations: before the crisis (T1) with during 
the crisis (T2); before the crisis (T1) with following on from the crisis (T3); and during 
the crisis (T2) with following on from the crisis (T3). We present the cross-tabulations 
to gain insight into the level continuity/discontinuity in innovation investment decisions. 
For example, are the firms that increased investment during the crisis also among the 
firms that increased investment before the crisis?  
 
Table 3 Innovation investment before, during and following on from the crisis. Cross-
tabulations of the dependent variables 
 
      During the crisis (T2)  
    Increase  Decrease Maintain Total 
Before 
the crisis 
(T1) 
Increase  Frequencies 332 445 1,124 1,901 
 Column percentages 76 38 40 43 
Decrease Frequencies 18 255 167 440 
 Column percentages 4 22 6 10 
Maintain Frequencies 88 469 1,538 2,095 
  Column percentages 20 40 54 47 
  Total Frequencies 438 1,169 2,829 4,436 
    Column percentages 100 100 100 100 
Chi
2
(4)=463; p<0.01 
 
      Following on from the crisis (T3)   
    Increase  Decrease Maintain Total 
Before 
the crisis 
(T1) 
Increase  Frequencies 358 631 907 1,896 
 Column percentages 58 43 39 43 
Decrease Frequencies 62 225 158 445 
 Column percentages 10 15 7 10 
Maintain Frequencies 200 625 1,270 2,095 
  Column percentages 32 42 54 47 
  Total Frequencies 620 1,481 2,335 4,436 
    Column percentages 100 100 100 100 
Chi
2
(4)=168; p<0.01 
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      Following on from the crisis (T3)   
    Increase  Decrease Maintain Total 
During 
the crisis 
(T2) 
Increase  Frequencies 192 73 159 424 
 Column percentages 32 5 7 10 
Decrease Frequencies 61 812 256 1,129 
 Column percentages 10 57 11 26 
Maintain Frequencies 350 544 1,832 2,726 
  Column percentages 58 38 82 64 
  Total Frequencies 603 1,429 2,247 4,279 
    Column percentages 100 100 100 100 
Chi
2
(4)=1,400; p<0.01 
 
Source: As for Table 2. 
 
In the cross-tabulations we report frequencies and column percentages below the 
frequencies. In the first column total of the top cross-table we report that 438 firms 
increased investment during the crisis (T2), and, in the first cell of the first cross-
tabulation, we report that, out of these 438 firms, 332 also increased investment before 
the crisis (T1). This is the same as stating that 76% of firms that increased investment 
during the crisis are firms that already increased investment before the crisis. These 
76% or 332 firms indicate some consistency of investment patterns and may already 
point towards, despite of the crisis, a confirmation of the importance of technological 
accumulation.  
But, out of the 438 firms that increased investment during the crisis (and 620 
that increased investment following on from the crisis, see the middle cross-
tabulations), 24% (and 42%) decreased or maintained investment before the crisis. And, 
it is among these firms that we could see a shift in firm characteristics and market 
conditions associated with increased innovation investment before, during and 
following on from the crisis.  
From the information presented in Table 3 we also know that there is greater 
stability in the investment choices of firms between the two periods during (T2) and 
following on from (T3) the crisis, also resulting in the higher measure of association 
(Chi
2
(4) = 1,400; p<0.01), compared with before the crisis (T1 and T2, T1 and T3).  
To fully address our research question of who the firms are that increase 
investment (top row of Table 2) in the midst of the crisis – (a) the most dynamic ones 
that compete largely on continuous upgrading or (b) new players that could be newly 
established firms or firms less relevant in aggregate innovation – we use a set of 
measures capturing firm and market characteristics to which we now turn, and that we 
use to predict innovation related investment across T1, T2 and T3 in the results section 
of the paper.  
 
4.3 The independent variables 
Table 4 contains an overview of the independent variables arranged by the categories 
introduced in Table 1. These categories are; i) characteristics of the innovating firms, ii) 
type of knowledge sources, iii) type of innovations and iv) market characteristics.  
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Table 4 Characteristics of the innovating firms, type of knowledge sources, type of 
innovations and characteristics of the market. Overview of the independent variables   
 
Characteristics of the innovating firms 
Newly established The enterprise was established after 1 January 2001 
Small enterprise There are four dummies that we use to measure the size of 
the enterprise. Small enterprises here have 20-49 employees 
Medium enterprise The variable selects all enterprises with 50 to 249 employees 
Large enterprises The variables selects all enterprises with more than 250 
employees 
Low innovation 
intensity 
The enterprise invests less than 5% of turnover in innovation 
related activities in 2008 
High innovation 
intensity 
The enterprise invests at least 5% of turnover in innovation 
related activities 
Type of knowledge sources 
In-house R&D The enterprise had expenditures on in-house R&D since 
2006 
Bought-in R&D The enterprise had expenditures on R&D performed for the 
company by other enterprises or by research organisations 
since 2006 
Link with other 
firms 
The enterprise developed strategic relationships in support of 
innovation with customers, suppliers or other companies 
since 2006 
Link with the 
knowledge base 
The enterprise developed strategic relationships in support of 
innovation with research institutes and educational 
institutions since 2006 
International 
collaboration 
The enterprise started or increased cooperation with local 
partners in other countries in support of innovation since 
2006 
Investment in 
companies abroad 
The enterprise invested in companies located in other 
countries in support of innovation since 2006 
Type of innovations  
Enterprise 
competes on 
innovations 
The enterprise sees the main competitive advantage in new 
products, services and processes 
Enterprise 
competes on 
improvements 
The enterprise sees the main competitive advantage in the 
modification of existing products, services and processes 
Enterprise 
competes on new 
business models 
The enterprise sees the main competitive advantage in the 
developments of new business models or ways to market 
products and services 
Enterprise 
competes on cost 
The enterprise sees the main competitive advantage in 
reducing costs of existing products 
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Characteristics of the market  
IPRs The enterprise applied for a patent or registered a design since 
2006 
Technological 
opportunities 
New technologies emerged in the enterprise’s market since 2006 
Market 
opportunities 
New opportunities to enter into new markets or expand sales in 
existing markets emerged since 2006 
International 
market 
The enterprise operates in international markets 
 
The first column in Table 4 gives the variable names of the independent variables and 
the second column the variable description. All our independent variables are dummy 
variables coded 1 if a characteristic is met and zero otherwise. We rely on dummies 
because of a lack of more detailed information. In the first category entitled 
‘characteristics of the firm’, the first variable is called ‘newly established’ and this 
variable is coded 1 if a firm was established after 1 January 2001 and 0 if it was 
established earlier. This variable is used as a proxy to identify new entrants. The second 
set of variables is made of three dummies that we use to proxy firm size. Small firms 
(20 to 49 employees) are used as the base comparison group in the regressions.  The 
final variable proxies the innovation intensity of firms or the stock/level of investment 
in innovation related activities with reference to the calendar year 2008. High 
innovation intensity is measured as a share of turnover – at least 5% – is spent on 
innovation related activities.
5
  Low innovation intensity (i.e. below 5% of turnover) is 
the base group.  
Under the heading ‘type of knowledge sources’ are six variables; first, a variable 
that captures if the enterprise engaged in in-house R&D, second, if it engaged in 
extramural R&D. The remaining four variables relate to linkages or joint knowledge 
sources; specifically, collaboration on innovation with other businesses, collaboration 
on innovation with educational and other research institutions, collaborations with 
partners located abroad, and investment in companies located abroad. All variables are 
coded 1 for yes answers and zero for no answers.  
Under ‘type of innovations’ or innovators we include four variables that are 
proxies for the strategic orientation of the firms with respect to their innovations: 
whether or not firms compete based on their innovations, based on improvements to 
existing products, based on a new business model, or based on cost savings.  Competing 
on innovation might lean more closely to activities at the frontier and might be seen as 
more closely related to path-breaking developments vis-à-vis the remaining categories. 
While improvements lean towards incremental innovations, new business models might 
be indicative of a new service. Competing on cost might favour the upgrading of 
processes.  There is, of course, much blurring and overlap across such categories when 
attempting to translate competitive orientation into ‘type of innovations’.  
Under the final heading ‘characteristics of the market’ are four variables. The 
first one captures the use of IPRs, specifically whether or not the firm applied for a 
patent or registered a design. The next two variables are used to capture the 
technological opportunities and market opportunities as assessed by the responding 
                                                 
5
 The dataset has a fourth category – innovation related expenditure above 50% of turnover – but less than 
1% of firms fell into this group and this is why we merged it with the next smaller band.  
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firms. 1 indicates that the firm perceived that there were opportunities (technological or 
market) and zero suggests a lack of opportunities. The final variable takes values of 1 if 
the enterprise operates in international markets and zero otherwise.  Table 5 provides 
and overview of the descriptive statistic for all independent variables.  
 
Table 5  Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 
Independent variables Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Characteristics of the innovating firms       
Newly established 4,664 0.08 0.28 
Small enterprise (base group) 4,664 0.40 0.49 
Medium enterprise 4,664 0.32 0.47 
Large enterprise 4,664 0.28 0.45 
Low innovation intensity (base group) 4,298 0.68 0.47 
High innovation intensity 4,298 0.32 0.47 
Type of knowledge sources    
In-house R&D 4,635 0.48 0.50 
Bought-in R&D 4,631 0.32 0.47 
Link with other firms 4,627 0.67 0.47 
Links with the knowledge base 4,628 0.38 0.49 
International collaboration 4,602 0.29 0.45 
Investment in companies abroad 4,620 0.11 0.31 
Type of innovations    
Enterprise competes on innovations 4,558 0.24 0.43 
Enterprise competes on improvements 4,558 0.23 0.42 
Enterprise competes on business models 4,558 0.16 0.37 
Enterprise competes on cost (base group) 4,558 0.34 0.47 
Characteristics of the market    
IPRs 4,613 0.15 0.36 
Technological opportunities 4,594 0.40 0.49 
Market opportunities 4,596 0.58 0.49 
International market 4,588 0.50 0.50 
 
Source: As for Table 2. 
 
Most of the dependent variables are observed for 4,664 firms (out of 5,234 observations 
in the initial database) in T1 (and 4,645 and 4,671 in T2 and 3 respectively) and Table 5 
presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables based on these 4,664 
observations. With respect to some of the independent variables we have missing 
observations where respondents stated that they did not know the answer. Specifically, 
4,298 respondents provided a valid response with respect to their innovation intensity 
and so on. Because of missing values (and missing values not occurring systematically 
by appearing within the same observations) we have a final dataset of 3,959 
observations in T1 (3,886 T2 and 3,890 T3) that is used in the regressions. This dataset 
is the largest possible dataset that contains observations for all dependent and 
independent variables.  
In Table 5, the column entitled ‘mean’ gives the mean value for our variables. 
Because these are all dummy variables, this column is the share of enterprises that 
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engage in a specific activity, e.g. 0.08 or 8% of firms were newly established, 40% were 
small, 50% of firms reported that they operated in international markets.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
We use regressions to analyse the relationships between our dependent and independent 
variables. Table 6 provides the zero order correlations between the dependent and 
independent variables, reporting polychoric correlations for the categorical dependent 
variables and tetrachoric correlations between the binary independent variables. 
Table 6 Correlations between the dependent and independent variables 
 
 
Dependent variables 1 2 3                                 
Investment in innovation related activity                       
1 Investment before the crisis 1.00                    
2 During the crisis 0.28 1.00                   
3 Following on from the crisis 0.21 0.44 1.00                  
Independent variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Characteristics of the innovating firms                     
1 Newly established 1.00                   
2 Small enterprise (base group) 0.09 1.00                  
3 Medium enterprise 0.02 -1.00 1.00                 
4 Large enterprise -0.13 -1.00 -1.00 1.00                
5 Low innovation intensity (base) -0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 1.00               
6 High innovation intensity 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.05 -1.00 1.00              
Type of knowledge sources                     
7 In-house R&D -0.03 -0.29 0.03 0.31 -0.28 0.28 1.00             
8 Bought-in R&D -0.02 -0.31 0.01 0.33 -0.15 0.15 0.63 1.00            
9 Link with other firms 0.08 -0.15 -0.01 0.19 -0.28 0.28 0.45 0.37 1.00           
10 Links with the knowledge base 0.02 -0.25 0.01 0.27 -0.25 0.25 0.53 0.51 0.58 1.00          
11 International collaboration -0.06 -0.19 -0.02 0.23 -0.25 0.25 0.41 0.36 0.47 0.37 1.00         
12 Investment in companies abroad -0.06 -0.25 -0.09 0.34 -0.16 0.16 0.38 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.65 1.00        
Type of innovations                     
13 Enterprise competes on innovations -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.20 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.13 1.00       
14 Competes on improvements 0.05 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.04 -0.07 -1.00 1.00      
15 Competes on business models -0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.12 -1.00 -1.00 1.00     
16 Competes on cost (base group) -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.15 -0.20 -0.20 -0.14 -0.11 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 1.00    
Characteristics of the market                     
17 IPRs -0.05 -0.24 -0.06 0.31 -0.26 0.26 0.53 0.44 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.19 0.05 0.00 -0.18 1.00   
18 Technological opportunities 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.21 -0.31 0.31 0.39 0.32 0.48 0.43 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.07 0.08 -0.19 0.31 1.00  
19 Market opportunities 0.03 -0.16 0.02 0.18 -0.27 0.27 0.35 0.28 0.48 0.31 0.41 0.29 0.18 0.04 0.13 -0.16 0.33 0.50 1.00 
20 International market -0.02 -0.23 0.01 0.26 -0.17 0.17 0.35 0.26 0.25 0.22 0.54 0.53 0.11 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.36 0.22 0.37 
Polychoric correlations between the dependent variables, and tetrachoric correlations between the independent variables, are reported. The variables Compete on 
innovations, improvements, business models and cost are mutually exclusive and thus yield a tetrachoric correlation of -1. Source: As for Table 2. 
The correlations reveal, in line with our expectations and our Table 3, that there is a 
higher correlation between the dependent variables ‘investment during the crisis’ and 
‘following on from the crisis’, than with ‘investment before the crisis’ (both with 
respect to T2 and T3).  Among the independent variables, the highest overlap exists 
between in-house R&D and bought-in R&D (r=0.63; p<0.01). Previous studies have 
shown that internal and bought-in R&D activities are complementing strategies, rather 
than substitutes (Cassiman and Veuglers, 2006). A high overlap also exists between 
‘international collaboration’ and ‘investing in companies located abroad’ (r=0.65; 
p<0.01), and both these variables and ‘operating in international markets’ (r=0.54; 
p<0.01 and r=0.53; p<0.01 respectively), suggesting that these variables taken together 
might be indicative of an international orientation of firms.
6
 The variables in the 
category ‘type of innovations’ are mutually exclusive groups and this is why the 
tetrachoric correlations return a value of -1. Competing on cost is our base comparison 
group in the regressions.  
It is a limitation of our dependent variables that we do not have continuous data 
and so we cannot use the classic linear model. The dependent variables are categorical 
variables that take the following categories: 1 = decrease in innovation related 
investment; 2 = innovation investment maintained; 3 = increase in innovation related 
investment.  
We report the results from two estimation models: a logistic regression model 
and a multinomial logistic regression model. The logistic regression predicting 
increased innovation investment compared to both the remaining outcomes taken 
together (decreased and maintained) is presented because the interpretation of the 
coefficients is easier; however, the model ignores that the firm is presented with three 
choices – to increase, decrease or maintain investment. The latter is picked up by the 
multinomial logistic regression. The logistic model is:  
 
Pr (y
 
=1) =
exp(x b)
1 exp(x b)
 
 
where xj is the row vector of the values of the independent variables. The 
multinomial logistic that picks up the three choices is:  
 
p
i 
=Pr (y
 
=i) =
{
 
 
 
 
1
1 ∑ expkm=2 (x bm)
, if i=1
exp(x bi)
1 ∑ expkm=2 (x bm)
, if i 1
 
 
where pij is the probability that the j
th
 observation is equal to the i
th
 outcome. 1 is 
assumed to be the base outcome, k is the number of categories (in our case 3), bm is the 
coefficient for the outcome m (in our case either 2 or 3), and as before xj is the row 
vector of the values of the independent variables. Based on one multinomial logistic 
regression, three sets of coefficients are reported: the first set of coefficients compares 
                                                 
6
 In order to address an issue of multicollinearity between these variables, we have computed all 
regressions (a) without the variable international collaborations and (b) without the variable ‘operating in 
international markets’. The findings remained unchanged. Results are not published, but are available 
upon request from the authors.  
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the choice to increase investment with maintained investment; the second set compares 
increase with decrease in investment; and the third set compares the effects of the 
independent variables on maintaining investment compared with decreasing investment. 
We now turn to the presentation of the empirical results in the next section.  
 
 
5. Results  
 
Two models are presented in this section. The first – logistic regression – reports 
coefficients that are indicative of the probability to increase innovation investment if the 
independent variables – all dummies – take a value of 1, i.e. the characteristic such as 
‘newly established’ is met. It is reported in Table 7 below.  
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Table 7  Factors explaining the choice to increase innovation investment compared to 
maintaining or decreasing investment (combined) over time   
  
Dependent variable: increase in innovation 
related investment 
Before the 
crisis 
During the 
crisis 
Following on 
from the 
crisis 
Estimation method: logistic (T1) (T2) (T3) 
Characteristics of the innovating firms    
Newly established -0.19 -0.12 0.27* 
  (0.13) (0.20) (0.16) 
Medium enterprise 0.13 -0.13 0.10 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
Large enterprise 0.12 -0.64*** -0.15 
  (0.09) (0.16) (0.13) 
High innovation intensity 0.97*** 0.20* 0.01 
  (0.08) (0.12) (0.10) 
Type of knowledge sources       
In-house R&D 0.33*** 0.21 0.20* 
  (0.08) (0.14) (0.12) 
Bought-in R&D 0.26*** -0.08 -0.07 
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) 
Link with other firms 0.36*** 0.33** 0.23* 
  (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) 
Links with the knowledge base 0.07 0.15 0.15 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
International collaboration 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 
  (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) 
Investment in companies abroad -0.02 -0.05 -0.33** 
  (0.13) (0.19) (0.17) 
Type of innovations       
Enterprise competes on innovations 0.29*** 0.36** 0.58*** 
  (0.10) (0.15) (0.13) 
Enterprise competes on improvements 0.24** 0.22 0.61*** 
  (0.10) (0.16) (0.13) 
Enterprise competes on business models 0.14 0.15 0.52*** 
  (0.11) (0.17) (0.15) 
Characteristics of the market       
IPRs 0.27** 0.32** 0.16 
  (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
Technological opportunities 0.20*** 0.04 0.07 
  (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
Market opportunities 0.16** 0.40*** 0.17 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
International market -0.16* -0.02 0.00 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.11) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included Included 
Number of observations  3,959 3,886  3,890 
Wald Chi
2
 (64)  524***  150***  179*** 
Pseudo R
2   0.11   0.07   0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the logistic 
regression coefficients.  Source: As for Table 2. 
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Before the crisis (column T1 in Table 7), and with respect to the characteristics of the 
innovating firms, the coefficients suggest that firms are more likely to increase 
innovation investment if they exhibit high innovation intensity (our proxy for stock of 
investment). The coefficient b=0.97 (p<0.01) is the largest coefficient in the column T1. 
Size and age are not significantly associated with increased investment, but the positive 
sign of the coefficients is in line with technological accumulation patterns (as per Table 
1). During the crisis (T2), ‘large size’ is negatively associated with increased 
investment, meaning that small firms (our base group) are statistically more likely to 
increase investment compared with the group of large firms. The coefficient b=-0.64 
(p<0.01) is the most influential coefficient in the column T2. Following on from the 
crisis (T3) new entrants are more likely to increase investment (b=0.27; p<0.10). Both 
patterns, small firms in T2 and new entrants in T3, lean towards the creative destruction 
hypothesis (as per Table 1). 
 In relation to type of knowledge sources, our second category of independent 
variables, there are positive and significant coefficients for ‘in-house R&D’ and 
‘bought-in R&D’ before the crisis supporting accumulation of technology before the 
crisis. But, ‘in-house R&D’ is not significant during the crisis but also positively 
associated with increased investment following on from the crisis, while ‘bought-in 
R&D’ is not significant in either T2 or T3 and the sign of the coefficients are negative. 
‘Link with other firms’ as well as ‘international collaboration’ is significant throughout 
and irrespectively of the time period (T1, T2 or T3). We use ‘link with other firms’ as a 
proxy for access to applied knowledge that we thought less closely linked to 
accumulation compared with generic knowledge (proxied by ‘links with universities 
and research institutes’ that remains insignificant throughout). Thus, the collaboration 
variables do not suggest a change in pattern from before the crisis to during the crisis. 
Finally, firms that invested in companies abroad appear less likely to increase 
innovation investment following on from the crisis (no effect before then in columns T1 
and T2). This variable, albeit restricted to the time period starting 2006, might capture if 
a firm was part of a larger, multinational company. Interpreted that way, the finding is 
closer to a destruction hypothesis. From our theoretical point of departure, the drop in 
significance of in-house and bought-in R&D during and following on from the crisis 
lends some support for the destruction hypothesis.  But the findings in this category are 
less clear with respect to applied and generic knowledge sources as the coefficients are 
consistent across our three time periods. 
 Our proxies for types of innovations reveal that throughout the three periods, 
firms that increase investment in innovation are less likely to compete on cost, than they 
are to compete on innovations (confirming similar results previously reported by 
Bogliacino and Pianta, 2010). Firms competing on cost are also less likely to increase 
investment compared with firms that compete on improvements before and following 
on from the crisis, but not during the crisis. The size of the coefficients increases over 
the three time periods, which indicates that firms that compete on costs are increasingly 
less likely to increase innovation related investment, specifically in T3 where the 
coefficients (compete on innovation, improvements and business model contrasted with 
competing on costs) have the strongest impact in the regression model. The sole 
significance of competing on innovation during the crisis, coupled with the increase in 
negative impact of ‘competing on cost’ is perhaps less indicative of accumulation as it 
is of destruction in T2 and T3.   
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 With respect to the characteristics of the market, our final category of 
independent variables, the coefficients in Table 7 for IPRs are positive and significant 
both before and during the crisis (but not following on from the crisis T3). The 
coefficients for ‘market opportunities’, too, are positive and significant in T1 and 
increasing in terms of the size effect in T2 (during the crisis). ‘Technological 
opportunities’, however, are positively and significantly associated with increased 
investment only before the crisis.  Strong ‘IPRs’ lean towards the accumulation 
hypothesis both before and during the crisis.   
In Table 8, a pattern consistent with that in Table 7, but with greater detail with 
respect to the differences in the choices to maintain investment and decreasing 
investment is reported. Table 8 (a-c) contains one regression model for T1, T2 and T3 
respectively, but three sets of coefficients are reported: (a) the first set of coefficients 
contrasts increase in innovation investment against maintaining of investment; (b) 
contrasts increase in innovation investment against decrease in investment; and (c) 
maintaining in investment against decrease in investment.  
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Table 8.a Factors explaining the discrete choices to increase, maintain, or decrease 
innovation related investment over time 
 
Dependent variable: increase in innovation 
investment (base group: maintain) 
Before the 
crisis 
During the 
crisis 
Following 
on from the 
crisis 
Estimation method: multinomial logistic (T1) (T2) (T3) 
Characteristics of the innovating firms    
Newly established -0.19 -0.14 0.22 
  (0.15) (0.50) (0.19) 
Medium enterprise 0.13 -0.18 0.06 
  (0.15) (0.17) (0.60) 
Large enterprise 0.06 -0.67*** -0.21 
  (0.56) (0.00) (0.11) 
High innovation intensity 0.99*** 0.30** 0.15 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.16) 
Type of knowledge sources       
In-house R&D 0.39*** 0.23 0.18 
  (0.00) (0.10) (0.14) 
Bought-in R&D 0.23*** -0.09 -0.06 
  (0.01) (0.53) (0.62) 
Link with other firms 0.42*** 0.37** 0.28** 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) 
Links with the knowledge base 0.05 0.17 0.11 
  (0.55) (0.19) (0.36) 
International collaboration 0.33*** 0.41*** 0.36*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Investment in companies abroad -0.00 -0.04 -0.27 
  (0.98) (0.83) (0.13) 
Type of innovations       
Enterprise competes on innovations 0.25** 0.22 0.39*** 
  (0.01) (0.16) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on improvements 0.21** 0.07 0.47*** 
  (0.04) (0.64) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on business models 0.14 0.08 0.43*** 
  (0.19) (0.65) (0.00) 
Characteristics of the market       
IPRs 0.32*** 0.34** 0.11 
  (0.00) (0.03) (0.43) 
Technological opportunities 0.18** 0.07 0.10 
  (0.03) (0.57) (0.35) 
Market opportunities 0.13 0.39*** 0.16 
  (0.11) (0.00) (0.16) 
International market -0.15* 0.02 0.06 
  (0.09) (0.86) (0.61) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included Included 
Number of observations 3,959 3,886 3,890 
Wald Chi2 (64) 652*** 431*** 419*** 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.07 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the multinomial 
logistic regression coefficients.  Source: As for Table 2. 
24 
 
Table 8.b Factors explaining the choice to increase, maintain or decrease innovation 
investment over time  
 
Dependent variable: increase in innovation 
investment (base group: decrease) 
Before the 
crisis 
During the 
crisis 
Following 
on from the 
crisis 
Estimation method: multinomial logistic (T1) (T2) (T3) 
Characteristics of the innovating firms    
Newly established -0.16 -0.09 0.35** 
  (0.43) (0.68) (0.05) 
Medium enterprise 0.16 -0.01 0.16 
  (0.23) (0.95) (0.20) 
Large enterprise 0.40** -0.54*** -0.04 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.79) 
High innovation intensity 0.91*** -0.02 -0.22* 
  (0.00) (0.86) (0.06) 
Type of knowledge sources       
In-house R&D 0.04 0.15 0.25* 
  (0.79) (0.33) (0.05) 
Bought-in R&D 0.34** -0.07 -0.09 
  (0.02) (0.66) (0.45) 
Link with other firms 0.10 0.23 0.14 
  (0.45) (0.15) (0.29) 
Links with the knowledge base 0.13 0.10 0.21* 
  (0.35) (0.51) (0.09) 
International collaboration 0.21 0.32** 0.33*** 
  (0.14) (0.04) (0.01) 
Investment in companies abroad -0.11 -0.06 -0.43** 
  (0.58) (0.77) (0.02) 
Type of innovations       
Enterprise competes on innovations 0.45*** 0.71*** 0.89*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on improvements 0.36** 0.55*** 0.83*** 
  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on business models 0.11 0.29 0.63*** 
  (0.51) (0.13) (0.00) 
Characteristics of the market       
IPRs 0.05 0.28* 0.26* 
  (0.76) (0.10) (0.08) 
Technological opportunities 0.31** -0.04 -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.79) (1.00) 
Market opportunities 0.27** 0.45*** 0.20 
  (0.04) (0.00) (0.10) 
International market -0.22* -0.15 -0.10 
  (0.09) (0.30) (0.41) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included Included 
Number of observations 3,959 3,886 3,890 
Wald Chi2 (64) 652*** 431*** 419*** 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.07 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the multinomial 
logistic regression coefficients. Source: As for Table 2. 
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Table 8.c  Factors explaining the choice to increase, maintain or decrease innovation 
investment over time  
 
Dependent variable: maintained innovation 
investment (base group: decrease) 
Before the 
crisis 
During the 
crisis 
Following 
on from the 
crisis 
Estimation method: multinomial logistic (T1) (T2) (T3) 
Characteristics of the innovating firms    
Newly established 0.03 0.05 0.13 
  (0.88) (0.74) (0.32) 
Medium enterprise 0.03 0.17* 0.10 
  (0.80) (0.07) (0.26) 
Large enterprise 0.34** 0.13 0.18* 
  (0.02) (0.21) (0.07) 
High innovation intensity -0.08 -0.32*** -0.37*** 
  (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) 
Type of knowledge sources       
In-house R&D -0.36*** -0.08 0.07 
  (0.01) (0.40) (0.42) 
Bought-in R&D 0.11 0.02 -0.04 
  (0.44) (0.84) (0.70) 
Link with other firms -0.31** -0.13 -0.14 
  (0.02) (0.16) (0.11) 
Links with the knowledge base 0.08 -0.08 0.11 
  (0.56) (0.42) (0.23) 
International collaboration -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 
  (0.40) (0.40) (0.78) 
Investment in companies abroad -0.11 -0.02 -0.16 
  (0.59) (0.88) (0.23) 
Type of innovations       
Enterprise competes on innovations 0.20 0.50*** 0.50*** 
  (0.20) (0.00) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on improvements 0.15 0.48*** 0.36*** 
  (0.33) (0.00) (0.00) 
Enterprise competes on business models -0.03 0.21* 0.19* 
  (0.83) (0.07) (0.08) 
Characteristics of the market       
IPRs -0.27 -0.05 0.15 
  (0.13) (0.66) (0.20) 
Technological opportunities 0.12 -0.11 -0.10 
  (0.33) (0.23) (0.22) 
Market opportunities 0.14 0.06 0.04 
  (0.26) (0.53) (0.62) 
International market -0.07 -0.17* -0.16* 
  (0.58) (0.06) (0.06) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Country dummies Included Included Included 
Number of observations 3,959 3,886 3,890 
Wald Chi2 (64) 652*** 431*** 419*** 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.07 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets under the multinomial 
logistic regression coefficients. Source: As for Table 2.  
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One caveat that Table 8 reveals, and that cannot be seen in Table 7, is that firms that 
maintain investment as opposed to both increase (Table 8.a) and decrease (Table 8.c), 
report lower innovation intensity during the crisis. Thus, reacting to the crisis by either 
increasing or decreasing innovation related investment are the two choices made by the 
more innovative firms.  
Another caveat taken from Tables 8.a-c is related to large firms. Before the 
crisis, large firms are more likely to increase investment (as opposed to decrease 
investment – Table 8.b) and are more likely to maintain investment (as opposed to 
decrease investment – Table 8.c). In contrast, during the crisis large firms are less likely 
to increase investment as opposed to both the alternative choices – to maintain or 
decrease investment (Tables 8.a and b). This, in line with the findings reported in Table 
7, suggests that the role of small firms in innovation during the crisis is greater (a) than 
before the crisis and (b) compared with large firms during the crisis, supporting the 
destruction hypothesis.  
Finally, comparing the choices increase and decrease in investment in the time 
period following on from the crisis, Table 8.b reports (as Table 7 before) newly 
established firms as more likely to increase investment. Among the remaining 
coefficients of the same set of coefficients, Table 8.b also reports that firms with low 
innovation intensity (stock) increase investment in T3. But, among the same set of 
coefficients, ‘in-house R&D’ and ‘links with the knowledge base’, as well as ‘IPRs’ are 
significant, providing a mixed picture with some characteristics closer to creative 
destruction (‘newly established’ and ‘low innovation intensity’) and others closer to 
accumulation (‘in-house R&D’, ‘links with the knowledge base’ and ‘IPRs’).  Thus, 
while we might have expected the patterns between T2 and T3 to be highly similar but 
different from T1, increased investment is not necessarily done by firms with the exact 
same characteristics and environments across T2 and T3, and some of the patterns 
dominant (significant coefficients) in T1 re-emerge in T3.   
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the current economic downturn is 
significantly affecting the composition of innovating firms. During major recessions, 
the economic landscape is characterized by huge uncertainties about the direction of 
technological change, demand conditions, and new market opportunities. The first 
significant result at the aggregate level is that the crisis has substantially reduced the 
number of firms willing to increase their innovation investment, from 38% to 9%. No 
doubt that the crisis has brought, at least in its initial stage, “destruction” in innovation 
investment. But the anatomy of these 9% of firms that are still expanding their 
innovation investment can provide some insights to check if the gales of destruction are 
also bringing something creative. 
We used two well-established, ideal type models – creative destruction and 
creative accumulation – to frame our results (as summarized in Table 1). For the 
purpose of developing the framework, we assumed a more clear-cut division according 
to which in regular times the model of creative accumulation prevails, while in times of 
crisis the model of creative destruction affirms itself. We are well aware that such a 
clear-cut division between the two models does not exist. We recognize that both 
patterns of innovation co-exist, and are likely to be also technology and industry 
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specific (as tested empirically by Malerba and Orsenigo, 1995). However, our data 
suggest that during the recession firms’ innovation behaviour is closer to creative 
destruction, while before the recession there is an overall landscape of creative 
accumulation. 
More specifically, Innobarometer allowed us to test two hypotheses: a) that in 
periods of economic expansion firms that are already innovating are the most important 
drivers of increased innovation investment, supporting the technological accumulation 
hypothesis; and b) that economic crises generate turbulence, and that newcomers are 
eager to spend more to innovate, confirming the creative destruction hypothesis.  
The empirical results support our arguments. The identikit of the innovators has 
in fact changed considerably. Before the economic downturn, firms expanding their 
innovations are: i) well-established; ii) engaged in formal research activities both 
internally and bought-in; iii) exploit strong appropriability conditions; and iv) involved 
in collaboration with suppliers and customers. During the economic downturn the few 
firms that are “swimming against the stream” by increasing their innovation investment 
are: i) smaller than before; ii) collaborating with other businesses; ii) exploring new 
market opportunities; iii) using methods of technological appropriation; and iv) less 
likely to compete on costs. Last but certainly not least, it also seems that younger firms 
are more likely to increase innovation investment after the crisis. While before the crisis 
technological opportunities have a positive impact on investment, during and after the 
crisis this is no longer true. On the contrary, in response to the crisis firms are more 
likely to explore innovative solutions by looking at opportunities in new markets. 
This witnesses an important change in the drivers of innovation as a result of the 
economic downturn. Since innovation is less based on local searching and cumulative 
processes, and less based on R&D activities within large firms, we conclude that the 
relative importance of behaviours is changing from creative accumulation to creative 
destruction in the snap shot of the business cycle that the Innobarometer makes it 
possible to observe. The fact that firms exhibit a more “explorative” attitude, vis-à-vis 
an “exploitative” attitude, is consistent with a situation of greater uncertainty that they 
face. 
During the crisis both formal R&D and technological opportunities stop to play 
a significant role in explaining companies’ willingness to expand innovation. This 
might be interpreted as the result of a decline of technological opportunities in 
established sectors which is typical during recessions characterized by technological 
discontinuities (Perez, 2002). Also, contrary to the previous period, innovation is driven 
by fresh opportunities in new markets. Our data cannot provide the ‘identikit’ of the 
new cluster of innovations that will generate the recovery (as indicated by Linstone and 
Devezas, 2012), but at least provide some useful information to trace the identikit of the 
post-crisis innovating firm. 
It could not be taken for granted that during a period of sustained growth firms’ 
behaviour lean towards accumulative patterns of innovation. During economic 
upswings firms have access to greater financial resources and thus might be seen more 
likely to explore radical and risky solutions. Similarly, it can be conceivably maintained 
that during a depression large established firms are better equipped to manage a 
situation of fall in demand and lack of financial supply in the market. However, we 
show that this is not the case. The number of firms declaring to increase their innovation 
expenditure has dropped dramatically as results of the crisis. It seems that what matter 
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are not large size and internal R&D, but flexibility, collaborative arrangements and 
exploration of new markets. 
Prospects for future research. Future work should focus on accessing data which 
allows for estimates based on longer time periods, the inclusion of more countries and 
more precise indicators on innovation intensity and the direction of technological 
change. In particular, we suspect that the crisis is reinforcing the shift from the 
manufacturing to the service industries, as indicated by in-depth country case studies 
(see Kim, 2011). We can wonder if this is a general rule or is something associated to 
the current phase of capitalist development, where the manufacturing sector, the core 
generator of technological innovations, is progressively accounting for lower shares of 
income and employment while, on the contrary, the service sector is gaining shares and 
is more likely to compete through non-technological innovations and by finding new 
markets. We can speculate that, if the economic recession is reinforcing the shift from 
manufacturing to services, it would not be a surprise that the firms increasing their 
innovation investment are more likely to be driven by searching new business lines and 
business models than by technological opportunities. In order to corroborate this 
hypothesis a definition of innovation able to capture the process of change in both 
manufacturing and services is needed. For many years, the Schumpeterian economics 
has concentrated on the technological dimension of innovation, which is typical of the 
manufacturing industries, and has somehow denied the non-technological dimension, 
which is more common when innovating in services. Times are ready to use a wider 
understanding of innovation, similar to what was pioneered by Schumpeter himself a 
century ago in the first edition of the Theory of Economic Development. The definition 
provided by Innobarometer and used in this paper has the advantage to be more 
inclusive than others 
Limitations of the study. The analysis presented here is limited by the data and 
the statistical models. First, the results are confined to Europe, and exclude the US as 
well as emerging countries. Second, the data offer information on three time periods for 
the dependent variables (but not for the independent variables), which allows comparing 
innovation related investment patterns before, during and following on from the crisis. 
Time series data would be able to provide much better information on the effects of the 
crisis, and the next surveys will certainly shed light on this. Third, data do not allow 
singling out the dynamic at the industry level. Finally, some variables are not totally 
satisfactory. True, the Innobarometer survey offers a unique opportunity to shed light 
onto the impact of the recent economic downturn on innovation, but we are well aware 
of the limitations of having carried out such a clear-cut classification 
Policy implications. In terms of policy analysis, it should be seen what the 
restricted number of firms increasing the innovation investment will generate. Public 
incentives to promote innovation can either be directed towards supporting the already 
existing R&D infrastructures or towards fostering new entrants. Identifying the 
characteristics of the innovators during the turmoil, as we have tried to do here, can 
shed some light on how policy instruments interact with technological accumulation and 
creative destruction. In which group of firms will the Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, Larry 
Page and Sergey Brin of the next generation be found? And are we sure that European 
governments, more and more concerned with the knowledge based economy, are doing 
their best to foster creative innovators, even if this will imply the destruction of slow 
growing wood? 
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